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Blackburn: Solicitation to Crimes
SOLICITATION TO CRIMES
JAmES B. BLAuKBumRN*
It is a matter of conjecture as to when jurists first conceived
the idea of holding liable criminally one who took no part
physically in the commission of a crime. In England this no doubt
took place some time after the advent of Christianity, after the
element of intent became of importance; when crime became a
breach of the peace, when society became interested and assumed
control and sought to regulate the punishment of crimes, thus
superseding the former notion of self help, kin interference and
the purchase of immunity.
Since recognizing the possibilities of committing crimes by
having them perpetrated through an agent, the law has sought
means of preventing criminal acts caused in such a manner and
has done so by providing punishment for the one thus participating
by his persuasive efforts, threats, commands and inducements. One
means used for this purpose was to punish an accessory or one
who aided another in the commission of a crime. With the end
in view of arresting a criminal act at its inception and thus preventing the planning of a crime, the crime of conspiracy originated.
An attempt to commit certain crimes has long been held to be a
crime in itself. One form of attempt is an endeavor to have a
crime committed through the agency or by means of another or
others, and by holding one criminally responsible for such attempt we have come to punish one who solicits another to commit
a crime.
This crime as it originally developed was concerned with the
punishing of one who by his persuasion, threats, bribes, or in any
other manner instigated another or others to commit a specific
crime; and it was soon decided that a crime need not result to
make the one persuading liable to punishment.'
There was still some doubt as to the nature of the crime of
solicitation in the early days of American independence, but the
courts soon realized the principle as one of the common law.' To
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
IQueen v. Daniel, 6 Mod. 99 (1703); King v. Schofield, 1 Cald. 397 (1784);
King v. Vaughn, 4 Burr. 2494 (1769); King v. Plympton, 2 Ld. Raym. 1377
(1724) ; King v. Johnson, 2 Show. 1 (1661). In none of these cases is
solicitation considered as a substantive crime.
2Commonwealth v. Harrington, 3 Pick. 26 (Mass. 1825); U. S. v. Lyles,
26 Fed., Case No. 15,646 (C. C. D. C. 1834); People v. Bush, 4 Hill 133 (N.

Y. 1843).
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the defense that the English common law was not in force in this
country the answer was very much like Mark Twain's comment
on the Baconian controversy,- that Shakespeare did not write
the works accredited to him but that it was someone else by that
name; that is, even if the common law were not in force, we had
a common law quite similar which was in force.'
1. Extent of Solicitation
Solicitation is an extremely variable element of crime. It can
be the all-important matter for consideration, or so slight as to
be almost negligible. One soliciting may on this account be convicted as principal of the resulting crime, or incur no criminal
responsibility whatever. From the importance it is possible for it
to assume, solicitation has not on the part of text writers on criminal law received the consideration it would seem to demand.
While they often consider it in discussing specific crimes, there has
been very little space devoted to it independently as a form of
attempt, or as of itself a substantive crime.
A person who incites in any way another to commit a crime
or a lawful act in a criminal manner with the intention of causing the commission of a crime, is guilty of solicitation, and this
solicitation may be so closely connected with the crime committed
that the solicitor would be guilty as principal of the crime, if committed. A enlarges upon injuries which he has suffered at the
hands of B for the purpose of inciting C to avenge them. Or a
person knowing that B is about to have a private meeting with C's
wife for some perfectly innocent object suggests to C that there
will be a criminal meeting between them, in the hope of causing C
to commit violence upon B. In either case the person soliciting
will be guilty of the crime which results from the solicitation, and
it makes no difference that he does not in terms suggest that any
unlawful act be committed, or even that he affects to dissuade him
from it.
For example, A, having wagered a large sum on the outcome
of a ball game, believes that the umpire assigned to that particular
game will discriminate against his team, and hires B, a former
criminal, to assault the umpire. In the assault following, the umpire is killed. A would be guilty of murder. Suppose, however,
that B commits an assault. In this case A would be also guilty
of the assault. Let us assume that B is thwarted and interfered
with when he is about to assault the umpire. In this case, A would

8State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828).
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be guilty with B of an attempt. Now, let us suppose that A is
unsucessful in his efforts to employ B to attack the umpire; in
this case A is guilty of attempt by soliciting. As a final example,
let us imagine A as an ordinary spectator at a ball game. A decision at a crucial point in the game is made by the umpire, of
which A disapproves. As is often the case, he shouts, "Kill the
ump!" Here there is no criminal liability on A's part, even
though for the instant he might desire the death of the umpire.
Thus we can see that on the circumstances surrounding the crime,
a solicitor may be guilty as principal of the crime committed, of
an attempt to commit a crime, or not liable.'
Fraud or subterfuge will not excuse a person from the responsibility. Where A procures B by payment of money to commit
a crime, both A and B are guilty, but if B is under some legal
disability such as age, or is mentally deficient, A alone is guilty;
or if A overcomes the will of B by force; likewise if A has B do
a lawful act which results in a crime, provided A intended the
particular result, A alone would be guilty.
The solicitation is complete where the solicitor has attempted
to persuade another to commit a crime, whether the latter consents or not, or whether having consented he makes any effort to
commit the crime solicited.' The persuasion must be of a person
who has not already formed the intent to commit the crime
solicited. If a person by suggesting to another a particular crime
simply arouses the criminal propensities of that other, the solicitor
would not be responsible if those criminal propensities go in a
different direction from that suggested. If A incites B to gamble,
he is not liable if B steals or commits breach of trust to supply
himself with funds; or if A inciting B to kill X or to break into
and rob the house of Y, and B, falling in with the general idea
goes and kills Z or breaks into his house.' But on the other hand,
if the one solicited in substance complies with the solicitation and
I United States v. Stephens, 12 Fed. 52 (C.0. D. Ore. 1882). This was an
indictment for soliciting an order in San Francisco for liquor to be delivered
on the Alaskan border, with the intent on the part of the defendant to
transport the same into Alaska, against the statute. The court held that
this was merely solicitation to a preparatory act, was not an attempt, and
that the defendant could not be held liable.
';Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545 (1883). Defendant endeavored
to procure A to set fire to the barn of B by offering money. B never tried
to set fire to the barn. Defendant was found guilty and the court gave
judgment on the verdict, holding that "solicitation to commit a felony, even
though of no effect and the crime counseled not committed, is indictable at
common law."

01 HAT P. 0. 617.
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varies only in matter of time or place or in the manner of execution, in such a case the solicitor would be a principal to the
crime committed, as if A commands B to poison C and B shoots
C. Likewise if A incites B to burn the house of X and an inmate
of the house is burned in it, or the fire spread to other houses, A
will be liable as principal.' That is, a solicitor is held liable for
a solicitation to what is reasonably supposed it would effect, or
again, what is likely in the course of events to follow the doing
of the criminal acts solicited.
2. Analysis of the Crime
a. Intent
Solicitation is the endeavor on the part of one person to have
a crime committed through the agency of another or other persons. There must be on the part of the solicitor an intent to have
the crime committed and the purpose of communicating this intent
to another or others. It must be the starting point of a series of
acts which, but for the interference of some circumstances beyond
the control of the solicitor, will result in the commission of a
crime intended by the solicitor.
b. Intervening Will Which Must Be Overcome
In order to have a real solicitation, the solicitor must overcome the will of an intervening party, or make an effort in this
direction with the intention to persuade. Should the persuasion
be successful and the one solicited assume the same intent as the
solicitor, there would be a conspiracy.
In this respect it is necessary to consider by what standard
we shall judge this intervening will. The objective standard furnishes no criterion, as we must assume at the outset that an
ordinarily reasonable prudent man would not be susceptible to
persuasive efforts to have him commit a crime.
Therefore the subjective standard is the one that must be
applied - that is, would the efforts at persuasion be such as would
likely succeed with the particular person or persons solicited?
In cases where a particular person or persons are solicited, this
could be determined by the actual fact as to whether they had been
persuaded. Where an indefinite or unknown group are persuaded,
we would have the question as to whether individuals forming
71

HA

P. C. c. 29, § 22.
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such a -group would be influenced to the point of committing crime
at the instigation of the solicitor.
c. Proximate or :Remote Possibility
Another question that presents itself is whether a solicitor
should be punished when the means employed could under no
circumstances effect the crime intended, even though the intent
to commit the crime, and the belief that the crime could be accomplished in such a way, existed. For example, A solicited B to put
a curse on C, A and B both believing that by means of the curse
0 would be killed. We do not think that in such a case A and B
would be guilty of any crime, for the only necessary element of a
crime present in such a case is the criminal intent, and the law
does not punish mere intent. In a moral sense, no doubt it is
wrong to harbor an intent to commit a crime, but with such the
law can have nothing to do. It is too speculative for judicial
tribunals to act upon. A solicitation to be punishable must extend
far enough toward the commission of the desired result as to
amount to its commencement.
d. Limitation
Standing as it does on the border of crime, solicitation and
its consequences should be clearly understood. It would never do
to state a rule so vague that it could not be understood by the
general intelligence of the community. Preparatory acts must be
carefully distinguished from attempts: An act or a solicitation
to be punishable must be such that in the ordinary course of
events it would result in a crime. The efforts of a solicitor must
be such that a series of acts have been started and have gone so
far beyond his control that he could not prevent their criminal
effect. For example, A has persuaded B to commit a crime. A
repents but it is impossible to communicate this repentance to B.
In the meantime B has changed his mind and decided to do nothing
further in regard to the crime, and nothing is done. Nevertheless A would be guilty of solicitation. The purchase of a gun with
intent to commit murder does not constitute an indictable offense,
'E parte Lloyd, 7 Cal. App. 588, 95 Pac. 175 (1908). Defendant gave
an order to have tickets printed, representing himself as agent for A. Printer
did not intend to fill the order. The court held this -was not an attempt and
defendant could not be held.
State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307 (1883). Defendant solicited another to commit arson, aided in the peparation, went to get a match, never returned, and
the crime was not committed. Defendant was held guilty of attempt.
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and when the solicitation is so far removed from the fact of the
crime that it is only an act of preparation, it is not an indictable
offense.
3. Solicitation as Attempt
Solicitation is frequently treated by courts and text writers
as a form of attempt, and this, we submit, is the proper view. The
use of the term "attempt" implies "to try", "to endeavor to do
something and fail". It has this meaning in criminal law, that
is, the unsuccessful effort to commit a particular crime. *When
one chooses another for the carrying out of the particular purpose, he is attempting to execute that purpose to the same extent
as though he had chosen an inanimate object as the means to be
used.
Another view is that solicitation is a distinct offense. It is
true that solicitation is not an attempt in the sense that one has
made a physical effort to accomplish a certain result and failed,
and it is on this point that the authorities disagree; that is, in
the last analysis upon the meaning of "overt act". Authorities on
both sides of this question use the much referred to case of Rex
v. Higgins
In examining this case, one can see a basis for both
views but we do not thinks that any of the opinions, rendered
seriatim, carried any conception of solicitation as a substantive offense. The judges were concerned with affirming a conviction, and the whole" theory of the case was to the effect that
solicitation was an indictable offense. They did not try to distinguish between solicitation as a form of attempt and as a sub02 East 5 (1801), SAYRE, CAsEs ON CRnimiN
LAw (1927) 340.
The
defendant was indicted for soliciting and inciting a servant to steal his
master's chattels. There was no proof of any overt act towards carrying
the intent into execution and it was argued in behalf of the prisoner that
the solicitation was a mere fruitless ineffectual temptation, a mere wish or
desire.
It was held by all the judges that the soliciting was a misdemeanor though
the indictment contained no charge that the servant stole the goods nor that
any other act was done except the soliciting.
Lord Kenyon said that the solicitation was an act and it would be a
slander upon the law to suppose that such an offense was not indictable.
Grose, J., said that an attempt to commit a misdemeanor was in itself a
misdemeanor. The gist of the offense is the indictment.
Lawrence, J., said: "All offenses of a public nature, that is, all such
acts or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community are indictable')
and that the mere soliciting the servant to steal was an attempt or endeavor
to commit a crime.
LeBlane, J., said that the inciting of another, by whatever means it is
attempted, is an act done, and if the act is done with a criminal intent it is
punishable by indictment.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss2/3

6

Blackburn: Solicitation to Crimes

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
stantive offense. Text writers have divided on this question,
Bishop"° considering it a form of attempt, and Wharton considering it as a substantive offense. The more modern text writers
have been inclined to follow Wharton's view.
Could we say that, in persuading a person who would not be
punished for committing the crime solicited, the solicitor is guilty
of an attempt should the commission of the crime fail, and at the
same time say that had the solicitor endeavored to carry out his,
purpose through one liable for his acts, that in such case he (the
solicitor) had not attempted? This would be to say that an effort
to commit a crime by overcoming an intervening will is not an
attempt, while persuading one whom the law says has no will is
an attempt. The difference is that in the first case we have as
guilty of the crime the one persuaded; while in the latter case
the one persuading. Is it reasonable to say that one has not attempted a crime because he has endeavored to persuade a legally
101 BisHoP, CRmINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) § 767: "A common form of
attempt is the soliciting of another to commit a crime, the act which is a
necessary ingredient in every offense consisting in the solicitation."
1 McLANE ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 220: "The form of intent which perhaps
involves the least degree of criminality is that of solicitation of another to
do an act which, if done, would constitute a crime, and such solicitation is
generally held to be punishable as a misdemeanor although the offense
solicited is never committed. There is probably no real difference in criminality between a solicitation and an attempt."
People v. Bush, 4 Hill 133 (N. Y. 1843). Solicitation to burn a building
was held an attempt even though the solicitor was absent and the one
solicited never intended to act.
The artificiality of the distinction is made clear in a recent article in
which stress is laid upon the idea that in every attempt case the emphasis
should be laid upon the particular crime contemplated and thus that one
can generalize on the subject of attempts only with reference to a particular
crime. Arnold, Criminal Attempts (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 53, 67, n. 37.
nWHARTON, CRimIAL LAW (10th ed. 1896) 179, (In speaking of solicitations as distinct or of themselves substantial offenses): "They certainly
are, as has been seen, when they in themselves involve a breach of the public
peace, as is the case with challenges to fight and seditious addresses. They
are also indictable when their object is interference with public justice: as
where a resistance to the execution of a judicial writ is counselled; or perjury
is advised; or the escape of a prisoner is encouraged; or the corruption of
a public officer or a witness is sought, or invited by the officer himself. They
are indictable, also, when they are in themselves offenses against public
decency, .... and they are indictable, also, when they constitute acessaryship before the fact ..... And the better opinion is that, where the solicitation is not in itself a substantive offense, or where there has been no progress
made toward the consummation of the independent offence attempted, the
question whether the solicitation is by itself the subject of penal prosecution
must be answered in the negative."
It is hard to understand the author
when he speaks of solicitations which in themselves involve a breach of the
peace. As a solicitation of itself could never involve a breach of the peace,
he must, therefore, mean solicitation to offenses which involve a breach of
the peace.
CLRx & imsrmr
(2d ed.) § 125: "and a better opinion is that solicita-
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responsible person to commit an act, and at the same time to say he
has attempted when he has set an innocent agent to accomplish
his ends? Those authorities who claim solicitation is a substantive
offense must show that it is not an attempt, and this, in our opinion, they fail to do. Solicitation is the act of trying to influence
another to do something which is a crime the solicitor wishes and
intends to have committed. We cannot see where this differs from
attempt and how it can be considered a substantive offense. The
fact that it is further removed from the crime intended and that
the chances of succeeding may be less, does not in any way tend
to show that it is not an endeavor, in fact an attempt, to have the
crime committed.
In considering solicitation as an attempt, indictments could
be better drawn. It would not then be necessary to include a
count for solicitation. The count for attempt would be adequate.
A most important question to be considered here is that of punishment. As a general rule a conviction for attempt carries with
it a more severe penalty than a conviction for the substantive
crime of solicitation in jurisdictions recognizing solicitation as a
substantive crime. But this is not a necessary consideration. If,
as we believe, solicitation is an attempt, it would seem from the
cases read that the courts in considering solicitation as a substantive offense have used it as a means for imposing a light sentence
in cases where they did not wish to go to the extent of imposing
the sentence necessary for an attempt, and yet at the same time
thought the accused deserving of some punishment.
By considering solicitation as an attempt, we would include
tion to commit a crime is not an attempt." And see Sayre, CriminaZ Attempts
(1928) 41 HAnv. L. REv. 821, 840.
Walsh v. People, 65 I1. 58 (1872) (Offer to receive a bribe deemed not
an attempt and not indictable as a solicitation); MclDade v. People, 29 Mich.
50 (1874) (Solicitation held not an overt act to constitute attempt according
to the statute; "overt act" meant physical act); Stabler v. Commonwealth,
95 Pa. 318 (1880) (An indictment containing counts for attempt and for
solicitation was held good as to the latter but bad as to the former, reliance
being placed upon WHARToN and Rex v. Higgins; Cox v. People, 82 Ill. 191
(1876) held that a solicitation to incest was not an indictable offense
since there was no overt act to make it an attempt); State v. Harney, 101
Mo. 470, 14 S. W. 657 (1890) (In an indictment for statutory rape, solicitation was held not an overt act. This case can be distinguished, however, on
the ground that the solicitor tried to persuade and gain the consent of one
whom the law holds cannot give consent). See also State v. Lampe, 131 Minn.
65, 154 N. W. 737 (1915) ; State v. Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 488 (1891).
One may, of course, be punishable under a statute forbidding the "inciting" or "procuring" others to commit crimes without reference to the common notions of the elements of attempts. See State v. Hudon, 103 Vt. 17,
151 Atl. 564 (1930).
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in all statutory crimes where provision is made for attempt, a
means of punishment for solicitation without having to specify the
same independently.
a. The Solicitation to What Crimes Should Be Punished
Although, following the case of Rex v. Higgins, the courts are
agreed that solicitation is an indictable offense, whether as a substantive crime or as a form of attempt, there has been no settled
rule as to what crimes must be solicited to make the solicitor
guilty of an indictable offense. It has been generally held that
the solicitation to any crime which at the time was a felony at
common law or by statute is indictable and the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors has been used as a basis to determine those crimes a solicitation to which would be an indictable
offense." Such a classification is governed by no fixed or definite
principle, but is purely arbitrary, depending on the will of the
legislature from time to time; it rests on no substantial basis and
affords no just criterion for determining to what crimes solicitation
should be an indictable offense. Under such a test the most
ridiculous line would be drawn. A would be punished for soliciting B to commit the theft of a chattel of little or no value, but
could incite to the destruction by fire of a modern city business
block and yet not be guilty of an indictable offense. Under such a
test A would be guilty if he solicited B, a bank clerk, to steal a
penny from the cash drawer, but might not be guilty should he
persuade C, the cashier, to embezzle millions.
Another distinction that has been suggested is to hold that
penny from the cash drawer, but might not be guilty should he
indictable.? Courts have held that the solicitation to crimes
which promote a breach of the public peace,"4 or to those crimes
12 CLAR
& MARsHALr, (2d ed.) § 191: "The decided weight of authority
both in England and the United States is in favor of the doctrine that it
is a misdemeanor merely to solicit another to commit a crime, if the crime
be a felony, though nothing further is done toward carrying out the unlawful purpose. The solicitation, without more, is regarded as a sufficient act
to take the case out of the sphere of mere intent.
"Whether solicitation to commit a misdemeanor is indictable is not so
clear. Some courts differentiate between solicitation to commit felony and
misdemeanor."
See Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 Pick. 476 (Mass. 1839); Commonwealth
v. Randolph, 146 Pa. St. 83, 23 Atl. 388 (1892).
"Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 405 (1897); People v.
Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175, 58 L. R. A. 509 (1902).
14State of Washington v. Butler, 8 Wash. 194, 35 Pac. 2093, 25 L. R. A.
434 (1894); United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (D. C. Mass. 1917).
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which tend to defeat the administration of justice' or to those that
are against public society and the safety of individuals' should be
punishable. Such distinctions are subject to the same objection
as the first one mentioned. It would afford no basis for differentiating, and to follow it would be very difficult, vague, and accomplish nothing beyond confusion.
As to whether solicitation to sexual crimes is an indictable
offense the authorities are in conflict. In Connecticut, solicitation
to adultery was held an indictable offense, while in Pennsylvania
it was held not to be an indictable offense, distinguished from the
Connecticut ease on the grounds that adultery was a felony in
Connecticut while only a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania. '
The
Pennsylvania courts have, if not overruled, confined the decision
to very narrow limits so that this case is of little, if any, effect.
Another distinction brought out in these cases is that adultery is,
while a crime, nevertheless one tending to secret morality and not
one involving a breach of the peace. The English courts have referred to sexual crimes as spiritual crimes and within the province
of the ecclesiastical courts rather than the common law courts."8
Chief Justice Wheeler in a comparatively recent case,"' has
suggested the best basis to distinguish those crimes, the solicitation
to which would be indictable, by holding that solicitation to a
crime should be a crime in every instance where the attempt to
commit the same offense would be a crime. This would be more
clearly understood and would be a better deterrent. As we have
shown, the evil to be prevented is the putting in the mind of
another, usually a weaker intellect, the criminal intent. A solicitation is often more dangerous to society than an attempt by the
solicitor alone and unaided to commit the crime solicited.
For
example, A wishing to have B murdered, hires C, an expert marksman, to shoot B. It is far more dangerous to society, and to B
in particular, than if A, inexperienced in the use of a revolver,
should attempt to shoot B by his own hand.
1
5State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57 (1836); State v. Baller, 26 W. Va. 90 (1885);
State v. Ames, 64 Me. 386 (1875).
"Rudolph v. State, 128 Wis. 222, 107 N. W. 466 (1906).
"7Commonwealth v. Harrington, 3 Pick. 26 (Mass. 1825); State v. Avery,
supra n. 3; Smith v. Commonwealth, 51 Pa. 209 (1866).
" Queen v. Pierson, 1 Salk. 382 (1705).
"State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 At. 805, 35 A. L. R. 961 (1923).
Cf. Arnold, op. cit. supra n. 10, at 68. Prof. Arnold, however, seriously misquotes the court's statement of the rule.
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4. Classification of Solicitation
a. Special
By special solicitation we mean those cases in which the
solicitor endeavors to persuade definite, ascertained, known persons to commit a particular crime or crimes. It is this class of
cases which we have heretofore discussed. As society became more
complex, the criminal law in regard to solicitation, just as our
law in many other branches, has had to enlarge and grow to meet
different circumstances. As originally provided, solicitation was
intended to mean those which we have chosen to call solicitations
of a special class. It became necessary to provide a means of
punishing those who advocated crime in a wholesale manner, without direct contact with those to be persuaded. Persons able to
reach great numbers with their arguments should certainly not
be permitted to advocate crime; so that solicitation was by judicial
reasoning enlarged to cover the new circumstances, which is but
another example of the ability of our common law to expand and
cover situations not in contemplation at the formation of the law.
Statutes covering such cases, have been enacted from time to time
but often are deemed simply declaratory of the common law.n
b. General
This class of general solicitations comprises those solicitations
wherein the solicitor does not know definitely whom he will incite
or persuade or to just what crimes or attempts the persuasion will
lead. The first group of this class is that type dealing with
orators inciting their audiences to criminal acts, or cases where
a mob leader verbally directs or counsels an excited group to the
"N. J. Coup. STAT. (1910) p. 1744: "Any person who shall, in public or
private, by speech, writing, printing or by any other mode or means advocate,
encourage, justify praise or incite the unlawful burning or destruction of
public or private property, or advocate, encourage, justify, praise or incite
assaults upon the army of the United States, the national guard, or the police
force of this or any other state or of any municipality, or the killing or
injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual shall be guilty
of a high misdemeanor." In construing this statute the court, in State v.
Quinlan, 86 N. J. L. 120, 91 Atl. 111 (1914), held that it was merely
declaratory of the common law.

II. . RBv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 38, § 581: "Whoever attempts to

commit any offense prohibited by law, and does any act towards it but fails, or
is intercepted or prevented in its execution, where no express provision is
made by law for the punishment of such attempt, shall be punished. .. .1
In construing this statute the court held, in Cox v. People, 82 Ill. 191 (1876),
that it meant a physical act as contradistinguished from a verbal declaration,
that is, a step in the direction, not a mere effort by persuasion to produce.
the condition of mind essential to the commission of the offense.
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commission of illegal acts. It has been argued that solicitation
was not an offense unless the persuasion of a definite, known person was attempted, and that it was not an indictable offense to
solicit generally.'
An endeavor to persuade is none the less so because the person endeavoring to persuade does not in the particular act personally address the one or more persons whom the address which
contains the persuasion or the endeavor to persuade reaches. An
orator, speaking to a large number of people, does not address
his remarks to any one individual among that number. He addresses the number. He is trying to persuade the whole audience
or a large proportion of it, and if a particular individual among
that number is persuaded, the speaker must be taken to address
his persuasion to those whom he knows hears, will understand in
a particular way, do understand in that way, and act upon it.
Convictions for solicitation of this type have generally been
affirmed.'
The second group of this general class comprises those cases
in which crimes are incited or instigated by means of published
articles in newspapers or elsewhere, advocating and advising the
commission of crimes. Solicitations of this type are more dangerous than solicitations of a special kind, for here solicitation is to
a great number. There is greater chance of success, and many
more are likely to be incited to crime than would be aroused by
special solicitation.'
The third and last group of general solicitation includes
those cases in which rewards are offered or advertised in such a
way that they incite or instigate the commission of crimes. Quite
early it was held an indictable offense to advertise for witnesses."t
If one invites the public to come and give perjured evidence, that
is as much a criminal act as to request an individual to do so. It
= State v. Schleifer, suprra n. 19.
Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 S. Ct. 252 (1919) (Affirming
conviction of defendant for conspiring to solicit citizens to refuse to register
under the Selective Draft Law).
' United States v. Galleanni, supra n. 14 (Indictment held sufficient which
alleged that defendants conspired and by newspaper articles endeavored to
persuade persons subject to the Selective Draft Law not to register thereunder, although it did not appear that the solicitations had in any case been
successful).
"Pool v. Sacheverel, 1 P. Wins. 675 (1720). "It is equally criminal when
the offer is to any, for to any is to any particular person. This advertisement will come to all persons, to rogues as well as honest men: and it
is a strange way of arguing to say, that offering a reward to one witness is
criminal, but that offering it to more than one is not so: surely it is more
criminal, as it may corrupt more."
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is just as criminal to publish to the whole world that the author
rejoices in regicide and recommends others to follow his example
and trusts that the time is not long distant when once a month
kings may fall.'
The better rule to adopt in cases of this type is to hold that
the advertiser whose advertisement solicits or instigates a crime,
if the tendency or endeavor of the advertisement would be to have
crimes committed for the sake of the reward, is guilty of solicitation. Cases of this type usually arise from a reward offered for
the killing of criminals or persons engaged in criminal acts. A
killing to gain a reward would not be justifiable and the advertiser
should be guilty of solicitation.'
5. Defenses to tte Charge of Solicitation
a. Justification for the Purpose of Entrapment
There is no doubt that solicitation to the commission of a
crime is justifiable under certain circumstances, namely, where a
police officer acting within the scope of his duties could encourage
a plan of a criminal, provided this plan is in the process of fulfllment, and the idea of committing the crime did not originate
with the officer. A police officer would also be justified in soliciting to a crime a person he had reasonable grounds to believe was
engaged in a criminal career. He would likewise be justified in
soliciting for the purpose of detecting a crime which had been perpetrated. He is not, however, justified in causing the commission
of the crime which would result directly from his suggestion, provided the one solicited had not entertained any criminal intent,
except for and until the suggestion by the officer.
Disregard for the law has been on the increase. This is no
doubt due to many causes. An unpopular law is very difficult
to enforce, and naturally renders those trying to enforce it so
unpopular that they never receive the support or cooperation of
the public. It is also a fact that those who, in enforcing the law,
render themselves unpopular, cause a certain amount of disrespect
for the law they endeavor to enforce.
A great number of our
people consider those enforcing the law as the personification of
the law, and regard it accordingly, so that when we have police
officers employing methods arousing resentment, and an attitude
of antagonism, rather than of cooperation, we have discovered
!'Queen v. Most, 7 Q. B. D. 244 (1881).
^ Note (1928) 6 TEx. L. REv. 184.
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one cause for this growing disregard of the law. It is very difficult
to create a proper respect for law if its representatives have to
suggest crimes, advise and persuade their victims to commit them
for the sole purpose of adding convictions in our records, and inmates to our penal institutions.
This is very well brought out by the court in Love v. People :"
"Strong men are sometimes unprepared to cope with
temptation and resist encouragement to evil when financially
embarrassed and impoverished. A contemplated crime may
never be developed into a consummated act. To stimulate
unlawful intentions for the purpose and with the motive of
bringing them to maturity so the consequent crime may be
punished, is a dangerous practice. It is safer law and sounder
morals to hold, where one arranges to have a crime committed
against his property or himself, and knows that an attempt
is to be made to encourage others to commit the act by one
acting in concert with such owner, that no crime is thus committed. The owner and his agent may wait passively for the
would-be criminal to perpetrate the offense, and each and
every part of it, for himself, but theypunish."
to must not aid, encourage
or solicit him that they may seek
The object of our criminal laws and their enforcement should
-not be to ascertain how many of our citizens can be persuaded to
commit crimes, nor is it a -proving ground for the theory that
every man has his price."
b. Statutory Crimes Protecting Certain Class
There is another class of cases where the ones soliciting would
not be held liable because the law under which they would be convicted has been enacted for their special protection. 'We here refer
to the solicitations by girls under the statutory age. 'To hold them
for solicitation would be to hold them for attempting to commit
a crime which the law says they are incapable of committing.
c. Statutory Crimes, the Policy of Which Is to Exempt
In this class of cases, while the law is not protecting a particular class, it is said that that class shall not be guilty of the statutory crimes. Thus in criminal statutes in regard to intoxicating
-160 Ill. 501, at 508, 43 N. E. 710 (1896).
2'With reference to the important related problem of entrapment see the
recent significant case, Sorrells v. United States, 53 S. Ct. 210 (1932), discussed in (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 260. Cf. People v. Ficke, 243 Ill. 367, 175
N. E. 543 (1931).
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liquor the policy of the law is that the buyer shall not be held
liable.
d. Locus poenitentiae
To a charge of solicitation the defense of repentance is of the
same effect as it would be in any other crime, with this exception,
that in order to make repentance a good defense the solicitor must
dissuade the one solicited from carrying out his original purpose.'
If, however, the solicitor is unable to dissuade the one solicited
from continuing in his execution of the crime, an interesting
question arises. While the solicitor could show that he had given
up his criminal intent, at the same time the prosecution could
argue that the one solicited would never have attempted the crime
but for the solicitation. Whether the court would then consider
the one solicited as acting under the influence of the solicitor or not
would be a question that would have to be decided by the surrounding circumstances: A is so successful in the solicitation to have
B commit a crime that B becomes so furious that he cannot be
dissuaded, and consequently commits the crime originally suggested by A. It would seem to us that A would be guilty of
solicitation, contrary to the result which has been reached in such
a case.8
6. Advantages of Enlargiug the Scope of This Form of Attempt
With the exception of offering to receive a bribe,' we have
no cases in this country where one has been held liable who has
offered for consideration to commit a crime. Our law on solicitation should be enlarged to cover this type of cases. It would make
it more difficult for the buyer of criminal services and the seller
of the same to get together. A person knowing that he was liable
to punishment for his offer to commit a crime would be very careful in making such offers, just as at present a person purchasing
crime knows that he is liable for his attempt to purchase.
Foreign codes have provisions in regard to solicitation which
take this feature into consideration.
The German penal code
^3In Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 259 N. E. 55 (1901), defendant solicited and made preparations to fire his building to collect insurance. Before anything further was done, he repented and told the one whom
he had solicited. The indictment was not sustained, the court holding that
he had repented in time.
1 HAi P. C. 618.
Walsh v. People, supra n. 11.
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punishes one who has purposely solicitated or instigated another
person to commit a punishable act by means of gifts, promises,
threats, abuse of power, or by purposely causing another to act
through mistake or by any other means, and also provides a punishment for one who offers to commit a crime or offers assistance
in the commission of a crime. The French penal code and the
Italian code have similar provisions.
It is interesting to note that a code prepared by lawyers
familiar with the common law destined for a distant people, where
the provisions of the law must be explicit, capable of being understood and at the same time certain of enforcement, was very
definite in its provisions for punishment for solicitation,' which
shows the real necessity for providing for solicitation.
CONCLUSION
Thus we have seen solicitation, as other branches of our law,
grow and enlarge from the time when it only covered an effort
on the part of one to persuade, arouse, or incite another to commit a definite crime, to the point where it covers a persuasive effort
on the part of anyone to arouse any other to commit a crime,
whether the parties are known to each other or whether a specific
crime is planned and advocated. Of the two views as to the
nature of this crime, the better one is that it is a form of attempt.
This view is more logical. It conduces to clarity and certainty in
the law and tends to simplify criminal procedure.
It would be a distinct improvement to include under the
crime of solicitation those cases involving offers for renumeration
to commit or to assist in the commission of a crime.
3Penal Law of India, Sir H. S. Gour (4th ed.) vol. I, c. 5, § 107.
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